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DIES, MARTIN (1900-1972) 
McCarthy. Dies was not appointed to HUAC. He left 
Congress in 1959, but continued his devotion to the 
antico1nmunist cause as a dedicated 1ne1nber of the 
John Birch society. He died in 1972. 
KAREN BRUNER 
References and Further Reading 
Goodn1an, Walter. The Con1111ittee: The Extraordinary Ca-
reer of the House Co1111nittee on Un-American Activities. 
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968. 
Ogden, August Ray111ond. The Dies Co111mittee: A Study of 
the Special House Co1nn1ittee for the I1111estigation of 
Un-American Activities. Washington, DC: Catholic Uni-
ver1'jity Press, 1945. 
' See also House Un-American Activities Co1nmittee; 
John Birch Society; McCarthy, Joseph; New Deal; 
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 
DISCIPLINING LA WYERS FOR 
SPEAKING ABOUT PENDING CASES 
Lawyers sometimes believe that it is important to 
influence public opinion as part of the representation 
of a client. Perhaps the aim is to present a favorable 
case to:l potential jurors, or perhaps the client is a 
public figure whose reputation may be affected by 
the outcome of the proceedings. In any event, when 
lawyers discuss a pending case at a news conference or 
n1ake staten1ents to reporte1:s, these extrajudicial co1n-
1nents 1nay have a negative hnpact on the fain1ess of 
the trial process. Courts and bar associations there-
fore seek to limit speech concerning pending cases. 
These li1nitations pose a conflict between two consti-
tutional rights: the First Amendment press-freedom 
guarantee and the litigants' right to a fair trial, pro-
tected by the Sixth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court has tried to balance these rights. 
After a inid-century trial acco1npanied by a media 
frenzy, the Court grm1ted a writ of habeas corpus 
sought by a doctor who had allegedly killed his wife, 
on the grounds that the publicity prevented him from 
receiving a fair trial (Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 
333, 1969). In the wake of the Sheppard case, many 
states adopted rules to limit extrajudicial statements by 
lawyers. The Court considered a First Amendment 
challenge to one of these rules mid concluded in a 
divided decision that many existing rules were uncon-
stitutionally vague (Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 
U.S. 1030, 1991). The rule in effect in most jurisdictions 
now prohibits a lawyer from making an extrajudicial 
statement that will have a "substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." 
W. BRADLEY WENDEL 
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DISCIPLINING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FOR EXPRESSIVE ACTIVITY 
A public employee's right to free speech under the 
First Amendment is not unlimited and employers 
have the right to discipline employees for expressive 
activity under certain circu111stances (Pickering v. 
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 1968). The employ-
er has an interest in ensuring that its etnployees do 
not under1nine its operations or ll1terfere with acco1n-
plishment of its objectives. At the same time, employ-
ees do not give up their constitutional iights when 
they accept govern1nent employn1ent. Indeed, govern-
ment employees may play a particularly important role 
in enlightening the public about governmental opera-
tions by contributing to public debate and alerting the 
public about potential wrongdoing. Thus, the courts 
have developed a test for determining when public 
employers can discipline their employees for expressive 
activity. 
The threshold requirement for protected speech is 
that it must relate to a matter of public concern. If 
speech relates to an etnployee's private grievance, 
discipline based on the speech does not implicate the 
First Atnendment. (For further infor1nation, see Mat-
ters of Public Concern Standard in Free Speech 
Cases.) In addition, even if the speech addresses mat-
ters of public concern, when the en1ployee's speech 
rights are outweighed by the disruption that the speech 
causes to the operations of gover111nent, the e1nployer 
can discipline the en1ployee for speech. The 111ore cen-
tral the speech is to matters of concern to the public, 
the n1ore disruptive to govern1nent operations it n1ust 
be in order to justify discipline. The impact of the 
speech on discipline, working relationships, work per-
formance, and government operations is a significant 





DISCOVERY MATERIALS IN COURT PROCEEDINGS 
(Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 1987). In the 2005 
term (Garcetti v. Ceballos, 361 F.3d. 1168, 9th Cir. 
2004, cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1395, 2005), the Supreme 
Court had to decide whether an employee who brings 
to light suspected wrongdoing in speech required by 
job duties is protected from discipline, thus further 
refining the balancing test. 
In son1e cases, the govern111ent disputes that disci-
pline was motivated by the employee's protected 
speech, asserting a lawful basis for the discipline. To 
prevail on a constitutional clain1, the e1nployee inust 
prove that the protected speech was a n1otivating 
factor in the einployer's decision to discipline 
(Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education 
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 1977). The employee must show 
that the person who 1nade the decision was aware of 
the speech. In addition, proof of actual n1otivation is 
necessary; this can involve evidence such as the tin1ing 
of the discipline in relation to the speech, employer 
unhappiness with the speech, or the pretextual nature 
of the einployer's asserted reason for the discipline. 
If the employee proves that the speech motivated 
the employer, the employer can avoid liability by 
showing that it would have disciplined the employee 
for legithnate reasons even if the etnployee had 
not engaged in the protected speech. When there is 
disagreen1ent about what the en1ployee actually said, 
the e1nployer nlay rely on what it reasonably and in 
good faith believes was said in deciding whether 
to discipline the employee (Waters v. Churchill, 511 
U.S. 661, 1994). To ensure that it acts reasonably, the 
wise en1ployer will investigate prior to discipline \vhen 
en1ployee staten1ents n1ay have First Ainendment 
protection. 
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DISCOVERY MATERIALS IN COURT 
PROCEEDINGS 
In civil as well as crin1inal court proceedings, discov-
ery serves as a tool whereby all parties to an action 
can discover, before a trial on the nlatter's merits, 
precisely what evidence will be offered at the trial. 
The discovery process provides each party to an ac-
tion the opportunity to examine the evidence that will 
be used against them as well as to find or discover the 
evidence to be used in their favor. The rules of proce-
dure place few limits on the ldnds of evidence subject 
to discovery, whereas the rules of evidence place 
significant lin1its on the adn1issibility of discovered 
evidence at trial. For exainple, a deposition transcript 
111ay be used, in whole or in part, but only pursuant to 
the applicable rules of evidence governing admissibil-
ity and the applicable rules of procedure that set out 
particular conditions precedent to their use. 
Because the facts conceded in a party's responses to 
requests for ad1nission are not subject to dispute at trial, 
these responses are co111:1-no11ly used for docu1nent au-
thentication, for iinpeach111ent purposes, or as propf of 
the existence or nonexistence of an ele1nent of a claiin. 
Physical exa1ninations can be used to prove the extent of 
a pmty's injuries. Expert witnesses may be called to give 
their conclusions or opinions regarding information, 
likely obtained through discovery, provided to them 
before trial. In court proceedings, discovery is an equal-
izer, ai111ing all parties to an action access to the same 
information before it is presented to the trier of fact. 
KATHRYN H. CHRISTOPHER 
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